Savcı Siyaseti: Seçim Döngüleri Ceza Yargılaması Yoğunluğunu Belirliyor

Özet (abstract)

I investigate how political incentives affect the behavior of district attorneys (DAs). I develop a theoretical model that predicts DAs will increase sentencing intensity in an election period compared to the period prior. To empirically test this prediction, I compile one of the most comprehensive datasets to date on the political careers of all district attorneys in office during the steepest rise in incarceration in U.S. history (roughly 1986-2006). Using quasi-experimental methods, I find causal evidence that being in a DA election year increases total admissions per capita and total months sentenced per capita. I estimate that the election year effects on admissions are akin to moving 0.85 standard deviations along the distribution of DA behavior within state (e.g., going from the 50th to 80th percentile in sentencing intensity). I find evidence that election effects are larger (1) when DA elections are contested, (2) in Republican counties, and (3) in the southern United States--all these factors are consistent with the perspective that election effects arise from political incentives influencing DAs. Further, I find that district attorney election effects decline over the period 1986-2006, in tandem with U.S. public opinion softening regarding criminal punishment. These findings suggest DA behavior may respond to voter preferences--in particular to public sentiment regarding the harshness of the court system.

Yazarların özeti; kaynağından alınmıştır. Journal of Public Economics, 2026 · DOI ↗