Dönüştürücü Ağlar, İç Tehdit Oturum Kaçırmayı %1,3 Hata Oranıyla Tespit Ediyor

Özet (abstract)

Abstract Insider threats, in which a legitimate user’s already-authenticated session is taken over by another enrolled individual, evade one-time login authentication because the session is trusted before the takeover occurs. Continuous authentication, which re-verifies the user throughout a session from behavioural signals, is a natural defence. We study behavioural-biometric continuous authentication from keystroke dynamics and ask whether a Transformer network can detect insider session hijacking more reliably than established detectors. Using the public CMU keystroke-dynamics benchmark of 51 users, we frame each password repetition as an action token and authenticate over a sliding window of consecutive actions, training a Transformer encoder that attends across the window. On held-out later sessions, the Transformer attains an equal error rate of $$1.3\%$$ , compared with $$9.3\%$$ for a strong scaled-Manhattan detector, and it outperforms convolutional and recurrent neural baselines ( $$2.1\%$$ and $$3.1\%$$ ). Casting insider attack as an abrupt mid-session hijacking, the Transformer detects $$99.7\%$$ of takeovers at a $$1\%$$ genuine-user false-alarm rate within about five impostor actions, versus 80– $$88\%$$ for the statistical detectors. We further show that authentication accuracy improves monotonically with window size, visualise the learned user-discriminative representation, and document a template-aging effect across sessions that motivates adaptive thresholds. An ablation shows that the gain arises chiefly from the learned per-action representation and its pooling rather than from Transformer-specific sequence modelling, and we position the contribution accordingly: the novelty of this work lies in the windowed action-token formulation of insider hijacking and in its operational evaluation, not in a new attention mechanism. We also state plainly what the study does not establish. The evaluation is fixed-text, closed-set, and simulates an abrupt takeover; operating points are selected retrospectively on held-out traffic and therefore upper-bound what a prospectively calibrated deployment would achieve. We specify, and release, an adaptive-threshold and template-refresh procedure for deployment, and analyse action segmentation, multimodal extension, usability, and system-level cost, but we do not claim empirical validation of these under free-text, open-set, or adaptive-adversary conditions.

Yazarların özeti; kaynağından alınmıştır. Scientific Reports, 2026 · DOI ↗