Erdoğan, 2016 Darbe Girişimi Sonrası Dini Hareketleri Kullanarak Adnan Oktar Örneğini İnceledi

Özet (abstract)

Erdoğan and Religious Movements after the 2016 Coup Attempt in Turkey: The Case of Adnan Oktar Efrat Aviv (bio) Introduction Almost all Islamic movements in Turkey1 have ties with political parties and bureaucrats, although they may declare their opposition to political activism.2,3 Since the shift to a multi-party regime in 1946, a tacit competition continues between various religious movements, with governments easily playing one against another. In most cases, however, Islamic movements engage in politics for pragmatic reasons, that is, to prevent a radical secular regime and obtain political legitimacy. When establishing the Justice and Progress Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi [AKP]) from the ashes of the Welfare Party (Refah Partisi [RP]) in 2001 along with others, Recep Tayip Erdoğan declared that the party had renounced the traditional aims and discourses of political Islamism and embraced secular democracy. Despite [End Page 72] this strategic and ideological declaration, Erdoğan shifted toward a less democratic and more anti-Western rhetoric, especially after 2007. Throughout the AKP’s rule, Islamic movements in general, except for a few such as the Fethullah Gülen Movement (FGM), Yeni Asya, and the Furkan Foundation4 for Education and Service (Furkan Eğitim ve Hizmet Vakfı [FV]), supported Erdoğan. However, the coup attempt of July 15, 2016 led to a new phase in Erdoğan’s relations; thereafter, he demanded rather than merely sought the support of religious movements. Religious movements in the post-coup era were required to prove their loyalty and trustworthiness to the ruling party and state and avoid risking the regime’s stability. This article presents a detailed examination of how the relationship between the AKP and religious movements changed after the coup attempt through a case study of Adnan Oktar. It provides the historical background of the political situation and religious movements in Turkey, describes their relationship with the AKP, and finally carries out a full case study of Adnan Oktar. The article’s results will enable the understanding of the relationship between politics and religion in Turkey and will also offer an insight into how political powers try to instrumentalize religion, curbing the freedom of religious movements and communities. Historical background When Sufi orders and religious movements were outlawed in Turkey in 1925, the country officially became a secular state with strict subordination of religion. This state was established under the one-party rule in Turkey which lasted from 1923 to 1946.5 The Turkish Ministry of Religious Affairs (Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı; hereafter, “Diyanet”), a state institution meant to control religious discourses and practices and bring them within the state’s overall policies, was established in 1924. However, this created a dual structure involving both official and unofficial Islam; the former was state promoted, while the latter was not fully endorsed by the state or allowed representation in public spaces. The state realized the influence of religion [End Page 73] and that it could be used for political purposes. Thus, the Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (CHP; Republican People’s Party), the political organization that ruled Turkey from 1923 to 1950 and was most likely to prohibit religious visibility in public spaces owing to their republican beliefs, expanded the legitimacy of state-oriented religion. The CHP government opened Islamic (Imam-Hatip) schools and a new theology faculty at Ankara University. They increased the Diyanet’s budget to win the hearts of the peripheral lower-class and rural masses, particularly those who opposed the early republican CHP government’s repressive laik6 policy.7 From the 1950s onward, religious movements became more visible both socially and politically. Without positioning itself against the CHP’s laiklik, the Democratic Party (Demokrat Parti [DP]), which ruled Turkey from 1950 to 1960, softened the state’s repressive and secularist policies, a dynamic change that continued throughout its regime until the first military coup in 1960. In the meantime, state-controlled Islamic organizations reemerged, in parallel with religious brotherhoods. During these years, Turks began studying abroad, particularly in Egypt and Saudi Arabia, and they brought the political Islam and Sunni traditions of the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafists back to Turkey. From the 1960s until today, rather than turn toward...

Yazarların özeti; kaynağından alınmıştır. Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern studies, 2022 · DOI ↗