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· 2019

Bentham and the Common Law Tradition

Gerald J. Postema

Short summary

Jeremy Bentham's legal positivism is reinterpreted as being fundamentally utilitarian, not merely coincidentally so, and his framework for judicial discretion in the shadow of codified law is highlighted.

AI-generated from the title and abstract; the full text is not read.

Key points

  • Bentham's legal positivism is rooted in his utilitarian commitment to law's fundamental task.
  • Publicity and systemic character of law led Bentham to integrate utilitarian reasons into its functioning.
  • Bentham developed a framework for judicial discretion within codified law to balance certainty and flexibility.
  • Judges were given discretion to decide cases based on utility, with accountability through institutional incentives.

AI-generated from the title and abstract; the full text is not read.

Abstract

Abstract This work explores the relationship between Bentham's utilitarian practical philosophy and his positivist jurisprudence. These theories appear to be in tension because his utilitarian commitment to the sovereignty of utility as a practical decision principle seems inconsistent with his positivist insistence on the sovereignty of the will of the lawmaker. Two themes emerge from the attempt in this work to reconcile these two core elements of Bentham's practical thought. First, Bentham's conception of law does not fit the conventional model of legal positivism. Bentham was not just a utilitarian and a positivist; he was a positivist by virtue of his commitment to a utilitarian understanding of the fundamental task of law. Moreover, his emphasis on the necessary publicity and the systemic character of law, led him to insist on an essential role for utilitarian reasons in the regular public functioning of law. Second, Bentham's radical critique of common law theory and practice convinced him of the necessity to reconcile the need for certainty of law with an equally great need for its flexibility. He eventually developed a constitutional framework for adjudication in the shadow of codified law that accorded judges discretion to decide particular cases according to their best judgment of the balance of utilities, guaranteeing the accountability and appropriate motivation of judicial decision-making through institutional incentives. The original text of this work, first published in 1986, remains largely unchanged, but an afterword reconsiders and revises some themes in response to criticism.

The authors' abstract, as published at the source., 2019 · DOI ↗

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Field: Law

LawSocial Sciences