Recovering from inauthenticity: Counterfactual thinking and the consequences of feeling inauthentic

Abstract

Counterfactual (i.e., “If only…”) thinking allows individuals to compare what has happened to what might have been, and may imbue both positive and negative events with meaning. Given authenticity's importance for well-being, we examined whether counterfactual thinking shapes affective and meaning-related responses to authentic and inauthentic experiences. Across four samples ( N = 1359), participants recalled authentic and inauthentic events (order randomized), generated either counterfactual or factual details, and reported event-induced meaning in life and affect. In primary analyses on the combined samples, inauthenticity experiences elicited lower positive affect, greater negative affect, and lower meaning in life. Event type interacted with thought type, such that these affective and meaning in life differences by event were attenuated when participants thought counterfactually in the combined sample. Furthermore, affect significantly mediated the moderation of event and thought type on meaning in life, such that affect was a stronger mediator when participants thought factually than counterfactually. Findings were less consistent by individual sample, particularly regarding the interaction effects. This is discussed as an important limitation in conversation with robustness checks on the combined analyses. These findings provide preliminary evidence that counterfactual thinking may regulate emotional responses to authentic and inauthentic experiences, thereby weakening their association with meaning in life. However, effects on meaning were less robust and should be interpreted cautiously. Counterfactual thinking may therefore function as a double-edged sword when it comes to affect and authenticity, softening the negative impact of inauthentic reflection while dampening the positive impact of authentic reflection.

The authors' abstract, as published at the source. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 2026 · DOI ↗