Developmental asymmetries in equilibrium selection

Abstract

Abstract Coordination problems are central to social and economic life and often involve multiple equilibria. Classical theories identify two canonical principles for equilibrium selection: maximizing payoffs and minimizing strategic risk. These principles differ in what they demand of a decision-maker: payoff-based coordination can be reached by recognizing that one equilibrium pays more, whereas risk-based coordination requires reasoning about what happens when coordination fails. Yet little is known about how the use of these principles varies from late childhood to early adulthood. Using a large sample of more than 2,000 participants aged 10 to 20, who played two coordination games and then stated the reason for each choice, we construct measures that pair each choice with a congruent stated reason and document an asymmetry in their age profiles. Payoff-based coordination is already high at the earliest ages studied and shows at most a weak age gradient. In contrast, risk-based coordination shows a modest but consistent increase with age. The difference between the two age gradients is statistically significant; the risk-based gradient also appears within the study using a common protocol across ages and in the risk-dominant choice itself. Cognitive ability shifts the level of both measures but does not alter their age profiles. These findings show that payoff-based and risk-based coordination vary differently with age, while similar observed choices can be accompanied by different stated reasons.

The authors' abstract, as published at the source. PNAS Nexus, 2026 · DOI ↗