Chinese and Russian nuclear energy companies in Europe’s geoeconomic turn: giving way to the Americans?

Abstract

Existing studies of Europe’s geoeconomic turn focus on EU policy instruments while neglecting the role of national governments and the impacts on commercial actors on the ground. This article fills these gaps by examining how European states reduce their exposure to Chinese and Russian nuclear energy state-owned enterprises (SOEs) involved in financing and constructing European nuclear power plants, and how such derisking measures affect the operations of these SOEs in Europe. It offers two key findings. First, European states are derisking from Chinese and Russian nuclear energy SOEs through a combination of internal and external, governmental and market-based measures. Second, as a result of this derisking process, Chinese and Russian SOEs have failed to make equity investment, gain market access, or expand market share. Meanwhile, Europe’s derisking efforts introduce new dependence on capital and companies from the US and its non-European allies rather than enhancing European energy autonomy. These findings contribute to the study of Europe’s geoeconomic turn, the EU’s pursuit of strategic autonomy, transatlantic relations, and the reconfiguration of the global production system.

The authors' abstract, as published at the source. New Political Economy, 2026 · DOI ↗