American Economic Journal Microeconomics· 2026Q1
Symmetric Equilibrium in Pre-auction Investment
- 1citations
- Q1SCImago
- 2026year
Short summary
A symmetric equilibrium exists and is unique for pre-auction investment games across a wide class of internet ad auction formats.
AI-generated from the title and abstract; the full text is not read.
Key points
- A symmetric equilibrium exists for pre-auction investment games in internet ad auctions.
- This equilibrium is essentially unique and consistent across a wide class of auction formats.
- Sufficient conditions are given for the equilibrium to be in pure strategies and efficient.
- Comparative statics results are derived with respect to various parameters.
AI-generated from the title and abstract; the full text is not read.
Abstract
We characterize the symmetric equilibria of a pre-auction game of investment in an internet ad auction environment. For a wide class of auction formats, we show a symmetric equilibrium exists for the pre-auction investment game, is essentially unique, and is the same for all auction formats in the class. We give sufficient conditions for the symmetric equilibrium to be in pure strategies and to achieve the efficient level of investment. Finally, we show comparative statics results with respect to a variety of parameters. (JEL D44, D82)
The authors' abstract, as published at the source. American Economic Journal Microeconomics, 2026 · DOI ↗
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Field: Management Science and Operations Research
Management Science and Operations ResearchDecision Sciences