Journal of Economic Theory· 2026Q1
Strategic ignorance and information design
- 4citations
- Q1SCImago
- 2026year
Short summary
Information designers may need to account for agents strategically ignoring signals, as this can lead to outcomes misaligned with the designer's intent, even when maximizing agent payoffs.
AI-generated from the title and abstract; the full text is not read.
Key points
- Agents strategically ignoring signals can lead to misaligned outcomes in information design.
- A new equilibrium concept, 'robust correlated equilibrium', is introduced to address strategic ignorance.
- Optimal information design may involve providing redundant or counterproductive information.
- Asymmetric information structures can be optimal in symmetric environments when strategic ignorance is considered.
- Sequential communication may harm the designer's objectives.
AI-generated from the title and abstract; the full text is not read.
Abstract
We study information design in strategic settings when agents can publicly commit to not view their private signals. Ignoring the constraints that agents must be willing to view their signals may lead to substantial divergence between the designer’s intent and actual outcomes, even in the case where the designer seeks to maximize the agents' payoffs. We introduce the approprite equilibrium concept — robust correlated equilibrium — and characterize implementable distributions over states and actions. Requiring robustness to strategic ignorance can explain qualitative properties that standard information design cannot: the designer may provide redundant or even conterproductive information, asymmetric information structures may be strictly optimal in symmetric environments, providing information conditional on players' choices rather than all at once may hurt the designer, and communication between players may help her. Optimality may require that players ignore their signals with positive probability.
The authors' abstract, as published at the source. Journal of Economic Theory, 2026 · DOI ↗
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Field: Management Science and Operations Research
Management Science and Operations ResearchDecision Sciences