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Review of Finance· 2026Q1

Who Do You Vote For? Same-Race Voting Preferences in Director Elections

Johan Sulaeman, Qiaozhi Ye

Short summary

Mutual fund managers are 14% more likely to vote for director nominees of the same race, particularly White managers in underrepresented minority fund families.

AI-generated from the title and abstract; the full text is not read.

Key points

  • Mutual fund managers show a 14% higher likelihood of voting for director nominees of the same race.
  • Same-race voting preference is most pronounced in White-dominated teams, particularly in fund families with low minority representation.
  • These voting patterns detrimentally affect minority director candidates' career progression.
  • Worse fund performance is associated with same-race voting when manager accountability is weak.
  • Evidence suggests taste-based biases, rather than statistical discrimination or conflicts of interest, best explain this phenomenon.

AI-generated from the title and abstract; the full text is not read.

Abstract

Abstract This paper highlights racial and ethnic preferences in corporate director elections. Using a comprehensive dataset of mutual fund voting records, we discover that mutual fund managers are more likely to vote for director nominees who share their racial or ethnic identity. Funds managed by White-dominated teams exhibit the strongest same-race preferences, particularly those in fund families with scarce minority representation. Same-race voting preferences have detrimental implications for the career outcomes of minority director candidates, and are associated with worse fund performance primarily when fund managers operate under weaker accountability. We investigate various potential mechanisms—including statistical discrimination, value maximization, conflicts of interest, social networks, and taste-based biases—and find that the evidence aligns most closely with a taste-based explanation for same-race preferential voting. JEL Classification: G23, G34, G41, J71

The authors' abstract, as published at the source. Review of Finance, 2026 · DOI ↗

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