British Journal of Mathematical and Statistical Psychology· 2012Q1
Philosophy and the practice of Bayesian statistics
- 606citations
- Q1SCImago
- 2012year
Short summary
Successful Bayesian statistics aligns better with hypothetico-deductivism than with inductivism, challenging the view that Bayesian inference equals rationality.
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Key points
- Successful Bayesian statistics aligns better with hypothetico-deductivism than inductivism.
- The philosophy equating Bayesian inference with rationality is not supported by current practice.
- Model checking and revision are crucial in Bayesian practice but fall outside traditional Bayesian confirmation theory.
- Inductivist views have sometimes discouraged model checking in statistical practice.
AI-generated from the title and abstract; the full text is not read.
Abstract
A substantial school in the philosophy of science identifies Bayesian inference with inductive inference and even rationality as such, and seems to be strengthened by the rise and practical success of Bayesian statistics. We argue that the most successful forms of Bayesian statistics do not actually support that particular philosophy but rather accord much better with sophisticated forms of hypothetico-deductivism. We examine the actual role played by prior distributions in Bayesian models, and the crucial aspects of model checking and model revision, which fall outside the scope of Bayesian confirmation theory. We draw on the literature on the consistency of Bayesian updating and also on our experience of applied work in social science. Clarity about these matters should benefit not just philosophy of science, but also statistical practice. At best, the inductivist view has encouraged researchers to fit and compare models without checking them; at worst, theorists have actively discouraged practitioners from performing model checking because it does not fit into their framework.
The authors' abstract, as published at the source. British Journal of Mathematical and Statistical Psychology, 2012 · DOI ↗
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Field: History and Philosophy of Science
History and Philosophy of ScienceArts and Humanities