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BMC Medical Education· 2026Q1

Effects of residency matching policies on regional distribution of residents: a simulation study using a stable matching algorithm

Hiroo Ide, Yuji Hiramatsu, Yuji Furui, Soichi Koike

Short summary

Simulations using the Gale-Shapley algorithm reveal that adjusting residency positions by up to 20% has a minimal impact on reducing regional physician maldistribution in Japan, with fill rates dropping slightly and regional disparities persisting.

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Key points

  • Simulations of residency matching for 10,207 applicants were conducted using the Gale-Shapley algorithm.
  • Adjusting residency positions by 5-20% resulted in a slight decrease in fill rates, from 82.9% (actual 2022) to 81.0-82.6%.
  • Regional fill rate rankings and medical school match rates showed high correlation with actual results (Kendall’s τ: 0.687–0.919) across scenarios.
  • The Gini coefficient for matched applicants remained unchanged, indicating persistent, minimal variation across scenarios.
  • Alternative reallocation scenarios also showed no substantial changes compared to actual 2022 matching results.

AI-generated from the title and abstract; the full text is not read.

Abstract

Abstract Background Appropriate geographical allocation of medical residents is often proposed to alleviate the regional maldistribution of physicians in Japan; however, its effectiveness remains unclear. We assessed the impact of adjusting residency positions and evaluated the effectiveness of different reallocation scenarios through simulation using a stable matching algorithm (the Gale-Shapley algorithm). Methods A cross-sectional simulation study was conducted using anonymized data from the Japan Residency Matching Program. A stable matching algorithm was implemented to simulate residency placement under multiple scenarios. Baseline scenarios adjusted the number of residency positions in each prefecture based on the physician maldistribution index at reduction rates of 5, 10, 15, and 20% (the 20% adjustment corresponded to a net reduction of approximately 1.5% in the total number of residency positions nationwide). Using the 20% reduction scenario, we further examined three reallocation scenarios: uniform reduction, reduction based on prior-year matching results, and reduction based on regional physician density. We compared the simulation results with the actual results of the residency matching in 2022. Results In the baseline scenarios, the matching process was simulated for 10,207 applicants. Fill rates (number of matched applicants divided by number of residency positions) declined slightly as adjustment rates increased, with the number of matched applicants ranging from 8,909 (82.6%) to 8,648 (81.0%), compared with 8,995 (82.9%) in the actual 2022 match. Despite this decline, minor changes were observed in rankings of the fill rates by prefecture or match rates (number of matched applicants divided by the number of applicants) by medical school, as indicated by the high Kendall’s τ coefficients (0.687–0.919). The three reallocation scenarios also showed no substantial changes from the 2022 results. The Gini coefficient for matched applicants remained unchanged compared with the 2022 results, indicating minimal variation across scenarios. Conclusion Adjusting residency positions based on regional maldistribution had a limited impact on reducing disparities. Regional disparities persisted even under alternative reallocation scenarios. Policy measures beyond quota adjustments, such as targeted admissions, nonmonetary incentives, and community engagement, may be more effective in addressing the maldistribution of residents.

The authors' abstract, as published at the source. BMC Medical Education, 2026 · DOI ↗

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Field: Emergency Medical Services

Emergency Medical ServicesHealth Professions