Disrupting global money? The geopolitics of cross-border payment systems based on CBDCs

Abstract

This article examines recent initiatives to redesign cross-border payments through wholesale central bank digital currencies (wCBDCs), focusing on two flagship projects developed under the auspices of the Bank for International Settlements: mBridge and Agorá. Building on a credit theory of money, it conceptualises cross-border payments as institutional frameworks governing credit–debt relations between countries, rather than merely technical infrastructures. The analysis shows that, despite their shared technological foundation, mBridge and Agorá embody divergent institutional logics and offer competing visions of the international monetary order. mBridge is interpreted as a project with disruptive potential, aimed at promoting a less hierarchical configuration of international money. By contrast, Agorá’s institutional design is read as fitting squarely within the existing dollar-centred hegemonic system. The article further argues that, despite these differences, both projects face significant limitations in their ability to facilitate international payments without encouraging the accumulation of global imbalances. To clarify these challenges, it draws on the historical experience of the European Payments Union (1950–1958), which placed the management of imbalances at the core of its design. By contrast, such central political questions remain largely sidelined in current CBDC-based initiatives, raising concerns about their long-term sustainability.

The authors' abstract, as published at the source. New Political Economy, 2026 · DOI ↗