Social Choice and Welfare· 2026Q2
Minimizing manipulation in matching markets without outside options
- 2citations
- Q2SCImago
- 2026year
Short summary
The deferred acceptance mechanism with the short side proposing is the only stable mechanism that minimizes manipulation in two-sided matching markets without outside options.
AI-generated from the title and abstract; the full text is not read.
Key points
- The deferred acceptance mechanism with the short side proposing is the only stable mechanism that minimizes manipulation in two-sided matching markets without outside options.
- No stable mechanism is strategy-proof for both sides in these markets.
- The Boston mechanism may result in fewer manipulators than any stable mechanism.
- Results are adaptable to markets with one-sided outside options and many-to-one markets.
AI-generated from the title and abstract; the full text is not read.
Abstract
Abstract In two-sided matching markets without outside options, we compare mechanisms in terms of the number of agents who can manipulate them. Despite the existence of several stable mechanisms that are strategy-proof for one side of the market, we show that there is only one such mechanism that stable-minimizes manipulation: the deferred acceptance mechanism with the short side making proposals. Surprisingly, the Boston mechanism may have fewer manipulators than any stable mechanism. We adapt our main results to markets where only one side has outside options and to many-to-one markets without outside options.
The authors' abstract, as published at the source. Social Choice and Welfare, 2026 · DOI ↗
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Field: Economics and Econometrics
Economics and EconometricsEconomics, Econometrics and Finance