Studies in Philosophy and Education· 2026Q1
Belonging, Fictive Relationships and Education
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- Q1SCImago
- 2026year
Short summary
This paper argues that educational policies promoting belonging overlook its moral complexities and the need for an internal, relational perspective, drawing on fictive kinship to question current approaches.
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Key points
- Educational policies treat belonging as an unproblematic 'good' without addressing moral/ethical complexities.
- Current models of belonging focus on external validation, neglecting an internal, relational perspective.
- The concept of fictive kinship offers a framework to understand how non-kin are integrated into relationships.
- The practical implementation of current belonging initiatives is questioned due to unacknowledged philosophical issues and difficulties.
AI-generated from the title and abstract; the full text is not read.
Abstract
Abstract Fostering a sense of belonging has become an assumed and unquestionable ‘good’ in educational policy and practice in much of the western world, so much so that countless policies and practices are devoted to inculcating it. These activities tend to treat a sense of belonging in educational discourses as unproblematic and ignoring the moral and ethical questions inherent in the enactment. The troubling lack of conceptual analysis of the concept in public policy enables the models used to examine belonging to always be to something outside of the person. I argue that articulating a philosophical account of belonging that embraces a relational account of being in the world requires us to go deeper to consider belonging from the inside. I draw on the concept of Fictive Kinship, an anthropological term for bringing non-kin into kinship relationships I argue that the lack of acknowledgement of the difficulties in achieving these aims and the failure of its proponents to take account of the underlying philosophical issues lead us to question the practicality of the vision as currently voiced. I suggest that how to be for children are not just empirical questions as to behaviour and training for schools, but are inseparable from questions of who we are and what we care about—and that this needs to be reflected in our policy making.
The authors' abstract, as published at the source. Studies in Philosophy and Education, 2026 · DOI ↗
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Field: Philosophy
PhilosophyArts and Humanities