IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control· 2013Q1
Attack Detection and Identification in Cyber-Physical Systems
- 2,075citations
- Q1SCImago
- 2013year
Short summary
This paper introduces a novel mathematical framework to detect and identify malicious attacks in cyber-physical systems, establishing fundamental monitoring limitations.
AI-generated from the title and abstract; the full text is not read.
Key points
- Introduces a mathematical framework for cyber-physical systems, attacks, and monitors.
- Characterizes fundamental limitations in attack monitoring using system and graph theory.
- Designs centralized and distributed monitors for attack detection and identification.
- Findings are validated through compelling examples.
AI-generated from the title and abstract; the full text is not read.
Abstract
Cyber-physical systems are ubiquitous in power systems, transportation networks, industrial control processes, and critical infrastructures. These systems need to operate reliably in the face of unforeseen failures and external malicious attacks. In this paper: (i) we propose a mathematical framework for cyber-physical systems, attacks, and monitors; (ii) we characterize fundamental monitoring limitations from system-theoretic and graph-theoretic perspectives; and (ii) we design centralized and distributed attack detection and identification monitors. Finally, we validate our findings through compelling examples.
The authors' abstract, as published at the source. IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control, 2013 · DOI ↗
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Field: Control and Systems Engineering
Control and Systems EngineeringEngineering