Erkenntnis· 2026Q1
Breaking Symmetry: A New Directionality Criterion for Regularity Theories of Causation
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- Q1SCImago
- 2026year
Short summary
A new directionality criterion is introduced to break symmetries in Boolean determination relations, allowing regularity theories to distinguish causes from effects without relying on temporal order or other external factors.
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Key points
- Regularity theories of causation face criticism for symmetric determination relations (sufficiency/necessity) that fail to capture causal directionality.
- Previous regularity-theoretic responses, focusing on minimal complexity of determination structures, were found to be insufficient.
- A new directionality criterion is proposed to overcome the symmetry problem.
- The new criterion allows distinguishing causes from effects based purely on Boolean determination relations.
AI-generated from the title and abstract; the full text is not read.
Abstract
Abstract It is one of the most frequent criticisms of regularity theories of causation that they cannot distinguish between causes and effects based on Boolean determination relations of sufficiency and necessity alone—jeopardizing their goal of reducing causation to Boolean determination. The criticism rests on the fact that determination relations can be symmetric but causation (in acyclic structures) cannot. Regularity theorists have countered by arguing that only simplistic determination structures are symmetric, and by insisting that structures with a minimal complexity of two alternative causes per effect exhibit non-symmetric determination relations. In this paper, we show that this regularity-theoretic response is insufficient to break symmetries of determination and, thus, to identify the direction of causation. To solve this problem, we introduce a new directionality criterion and demonstrate that it suffices to distinguish causes from effects solely on the basis of Boolean determination relations.
The authors' abstract, as published at the source. Erkenntnis, 2026 · DOI ↗
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