Noûs· 2026Q1
Referential Indeterminacy and De Re Thoughts
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- 2026year
Short summary
Speakers can have de re beliefs and knowledge about particular objects even when singular terms referring to them lack determinate reference.
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Key points
- Referential indeterminacy does not necessarily prevent de re or singular thoughts about objects.
- A distinction between weak and strong de re attitudes is introduced.
- Speakers can retain weak de re beliefs even without determinate reference.
- This distinction helps explain how linguistic understanding survives reference indeterminacy.
AI-generated from the title and abstract; the full text is not read.
Abstract
ABSTRACT Referential indeterminacy may seem to leave little room for de re or singular thoughts about ordinary objects. I argue that this impression is misleading. We can direct our thoughts at particular objects, even though there is no fact of the matter as to which objects are referred to by the singular terms purporting to stand for them. By distinguishing between weak and strong de re attitudes, I show that speakers can retain a weak form of de re belief despite the absence of determinate reference. I extend the same distinction to knowledge of reference, thereby explaining how linguistic understanding survives the indeterminacy of reference. I also briefly explore some broader implications of this picture for the theory of reference and for the status of genuine singular terms.
The authors' abstract, as published at the source. Noûs, 2026 · DOI ↗
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Experimental and Cognitive PsychologyPsychology