Philosophy and Phenomenological Research· 2026Q1
The Question of Referentiality
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- 2026year
Short summary
A novel unified account of reference fixing for names, demonstratives, and indexicals is proposed, capable of handling difficult cases without appealing to logical form.
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Key points
- Proposes a single, unified account for reference fixing across names, demonstratives, and indexicals.
- Demonstrates the account's ability to resolve difficult cases in reference fixing.
- Extends the unified account to support Predicativist and Quantificationalist theories.
- Offers an explanation of referentiality independent of logical form.
AI-generated from the title and abstract; the full text is not read.
Abstract
ABSTRACT Most theorists have offered different accounts of reference fixing for names, demonstratives, and indexicals. Indeed, this variety can seem an inevitable response to a certain class of hard cases. Here, I will offer a unified account of reference fixing equally capable of handling these cases. Then, I will show how to extend the account to help Predicativists about names and Quantificationalists about demonstratives accommodate these cases as well. One interesting upshot of this strategy is that it offers a way of explaining what makes a term referential that doesn't appeal to logical form.
The authors' abstract, as published at the source. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2026 · DOI ↗
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Field: Experimental and Cognitive Psychology
Experimental and Cognitive PsychologyPsychology