Canadian Journal of Philosophy· 2026Q1
Kant’s Argument that Mathematics is the Science of Magnitude: Comments on Daniel Sutherland’s Kant’s Mathematical World
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Short summary
This paper critically examines Daniel Sutherland's argument that for Kant, mathematics is fundamentally a science of magnitudes, requiring intuition for representation.
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Key points
- Critically examines Sutherland's argument that Kant considered mathematics a science of magnitudes.
- Investigates the claim that the world of experience is also a world of magnitudes for Kant.
- Analyzes the essential role of intuition in representing magnitudes within Kant's philosophy.
- Reconstructs an eight-step "Master Argument" connecting magnitude and mathematics.
- Identifies unclarity in Sutherland's argument concerning syntheticity and intuition in proof.
AI-generated from the title and abstract; the full text is not read.
Abstract
Abstract The main claims of Kant’s Mathematical World are that for Kant mathematics is a science of magnitudes, the world of experience is a world of magnitudes, and there is an essential role for intuition in representing magnitudes. This paper critically examines the argument for these main claims. It articulates an eight-step “Master Argument” that connects magnitude to mathematics through a series of intermediary concepts. Some of these steps are left unclear in Kant’s Mathematical World , and I argue that the book’s silence on syntheticity and the role of intuition in proof is a partial cause for this unclarity.
The authors' abstract, as published at the source. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 2026 · DOI ↗
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