Ratio· 2026Q1
Why the Good Is the Ultimate Form
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- Q1SCImago
- 2026year
Short summary
Plato's claim that the Good is responsible for the existence of eternal forms is defended, arguing the Good must be a 'Super-Form' from which all other universals derive their existence.
AI-generated from the title and abstract; the full text is not read.
Key points
- Defends Plato's claim that the Good is responsible for the existence of eternal forms.
- Argues the Good must be a 'Super-Form' if transcendent universals exist.
- A Super-Form is a universal from which all other universals exist.
- Discusses whether the Good can be good and if other Super-Forms exist.
AI-generated from the title and abstract; the full text is not read.
Abstract
ABSTRACT In a much‐debated passage from the Republic, Plato claims that the Good is responsible not only for the knowability of the eternal forms, but also for their very existence. This is a perplexing claim, and few contemporary platonists have been willing to follow Plato here. Even so, I develop and defend an argument to the effect, given that there are transcendent universals and that the Good is one of them, the Good cannot simply be one universal among many, but rather must be a ‘Super‐Form’—that is, a universal such that all other universals exist because of it. I then address the questions of whether the Good can itself be good in the same way that other things are good, and whether there could be additional Super‐Forms like the One. I conclude with the suggestion that contemporary platonists should reconsider the medieval ‘doctrine of transcendentals’.
The authors' abstract, as published at the source. Ratio, 2026 · DOI ↗
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Field: Philosophy
PhilosophyArts and Humanities