Frontiers in Psychology· 2026Q1
Quining qualia again. Ten reasons
- 1citations
- Q1SCImago
- 2026year
Short summary
This paper presents 10 reasons to abandon the classical concept of qualia, arguing it faces significant explanatory and ontological difficulties, and proposes that subjective experience does not rely on intrinsic, ineffable mental properties.
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Key points
- The classical concept of qualia is challenged by 10 specific difficulties, including causal instability and lack of empirical evidence.
- Qualia are not considered intrinsic, ineffable, or private properties located in an inner mental domain.
- The paper proposes that subjective experience arises from a reflexive architecture and the reconstructive nature of introspection.
- The authors do not deny that experiences occur, differ qualitatively, or are undergone from a first-person point of view.
AI-generated from the title and abstract; the full text is not read.
Abstract
Qualia have long occupied a central place in the science and philosophy of consciousness, often invoked as the subjective residue that eludes physical explanation. In this paper, we argue that the classical concept faces serious explanatory and ontological difficulties. We present 10 reasons for setting it aside: (1) its unstable causal status; (2) the regress of the inner observer; (3) the absence of a determinate neuroscientific target; (4) the lack of autonomous empirical evidence for a quale as such; (5) its epistemic redundancy and duplication of properties already attributed to the world; (6) the reflexive architecture that makes experience available in a first-person format; (7) the limits and reconstructive character of introspection; (8) linguistic reification; (9) the apparent immediacy of experience; and (10) the persistence of residual dualist pictures. We do not deny that experiences occur, differ qualitatively, and are undergone from a first-person point of view. We reject the stronger interpretation of those differences as intrinsic, ineffable, immediately self-revealing, and metaphysically private properties located in an inner mental domain.
The authors' abstract, as published at the source. Frontiers in Psychology, 2026 · DOI ↗
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Field: Philosophy
PhilosophyArts and Humanities