IEEE Transactions on Power Systems· 2016Q1
The 2015 Ukraine Blackout: Implications for False Data Injection Attacks
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- Q1SCImago
- 2016year
Short summary
The 2015 Ukraine Blackout provides a real-world case study demonstrating how false data injection attacks (FDIAs) can evade detection and compromise power system operations.
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Key points
- False data injection attacks (FDIAs) aim to compromise electricity grid sensors stealthily.
- The goal of FDIAs is to evade detection by the power system's bad data detection module.
- Successful FDIAs can lead to incorrect control actions by system operators.
- The 2015 Ukraine Blackout event serves as a case study for the implications of FDIAs.
AI-generated from the title and abstract; the full text is not read.
Abstract
In a false data injection attack (FDIA), an adversary stealthily compromises measurements from electricity grid sensors in a coordinated fashion, with a view to evading detection by the power system bad data detection module. A successful FDIA can cause the system operator to perform control actions that compromise either the physical or economic operation of the power system. In this letter, we consider some implications for FDIAs arising from the late 2015 Ukraine Blackout event.
The authors' abstract, as published at the source. IEEE Transactions on Power Systems, 2016 · DOI ↗
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Field: Control and Systems Engineering
Control and Systems EngineeringEngineering