Canadian Journal of Philosophy· 2026Q1
Trying to Be Moral, Morally
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- Q1SCImago
- 2026year
Short summary
Moral-epistemic circumstances (beliefs, evidence about morality) directly influence what one morally ought to do, challenging theories that ignore this link.
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Key points
- Moral-epistemic circumstances (beliefs, credences, evidence) determine what one morally ought to do.
- Objections to this view often stem from an overgeneralization of epistemic sensitivity to all moral norms.
- A proposed solution involves distinct procedural norms (sensitive to epistemic circumstances) and substantive norms (insensitive).
AI-generated from the title and abstract; the full text is not read.
Abstract
Abstract Often, we’re unsure what morality requires, and there’s a debate about whether our moral uncertainty and moral beliefs matter to what we should do. I argue that (1) our moral-epistemic circumstances (our beliefs, credences, and evidence about morality) matter to what we morally ought to do; (2) many objections to this are only problems if we assume all moral norms are sensitive to moral-epistemic circumstances; and (3) we should avoid this with an account incorporating procedural norms that are sensitive to our moral-epistemic circumstances (analogous to legal due process norms) and substantive norms that aren’t (analogous to substantive justice norms).
The authors' abstract, as published at the source. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 2026 · DOI ↗
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Field: Philosophy
PhilosophyArts and Humanities