Inquiry· 2026Q1
Knowledge-how and Gettier-cases
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- Q1SCImago
- 2026year
Short summary
This paper argues that the debate over whether knowledge-how can be Gettiered is stalled by unstated assumptions about what constitutes a Gettier case for knowledge-how.
AI-generated from the title and abstract; the full text is not read.
Key points
- The debate on whether knowledge-how can be Gettiered is characterized by a lack of clarity on the requirements for Gettiered knowledge-how.
- Both sides of the debate make unstated assumptions about the nature of cases that can or cannot Gettier knowledge-how.
- These implicit assumptions are the root cause of disagreement and the reason why the debate remains unsettled.
- The paper aims to expose these assumptions to clarify the debate's core issues and impediments.
AI-generated from the title and abstract; the full text is not read.
Abstract
There is a debate among epistemologists about whether knowledge-how can be Gettiered (e.g. Stanley and Williamson (2001), Poston (2009), Stanley (2011a, 2011b), Cath (2011, 2015), Carter and Pritchard (2015a, 2015b), Carter and Poston (2018), Pavese (2021), and others). The primary aim of this paper is to show that both sides of this debate have largely been talking past one another. Because neither side has been explicitly clear about the requirements for Gettiered knowledge-how, each side has been making unrecognized assumptions about the kind of cases that can (or cannot) Gettier know-how. I argue that it is these assumptions which explain why proponents accept, and opponents deny, that Gettier-cases can arise and undermine knowledge-how. With these assumptions laid bare, I can accomplish the second aim of this paper: To articulate what this debate hinges on and the impediments to settling it.
The authors' abstract, as published at the source. Inquiry, 2026 · DOI ↗
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Field: Philosophy
PhilosophyArts and Humanities