Australasian Journal of Philosophy· 2026Q1
Reasons Isolated from Good Reasoning
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- Q1SCImago
- 2026year
Short summary
This paper presents two counterexamples to the influential view that normative reasons are premises in good reasoning, demonstrating that reasons can exist independently of normal reasoning patterns.
AI-generated from the title and abstract; the full text is not read.
Key points
- Challenges the view that normative reasons must be premises in good reasoning.
- Introduces counterexamples of isolated *pro tanto* reasons.
- Demonstrates that reasons can be weak or normally overridden.
- Argues for the existence of reasons independent of normal reasoning patterns.
AI-generated from the title and abstract; the full text is not read.
Abstract
On a popular and influential view, normative reasons are premises in good reasoning, where good reasoning manifests a pattern of reasoning that normally preserves fittingness. I develop two counterexamples to this view: isolated *pro tanto* reasons that are either weak or normally overridden.
The authors' abstract, as published at the source. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 2026 · DOI ↗
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Field: Philosophy
PhilosophyArts and Humanities